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Abstract  Fisheries in the European Union (EU) continue to be overex-
ploited by an overcapitalised fishing fleet, despite the best intentions of two
decades of capacity adjustment programmes. This paper considers the
progress of fishing capacity under the Multi-annual Guidance Programme
and examines the impact of subsidies made available to the fishing industry.
The underlying reasons for the modest impact on improved resource
sustainability are considered, despite capacity reductions in nominal terms.
These include the impact of subsidies on capacity development and issues
surrounding the use of vessel decommissioning. The Danish fishing fleet
case serves as an empirical example in this regard. Comments on the future
capacity management regime and the role of subsidies in EU fisheries are
offered.
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Introduction
The main objective of this article is to address the role of subsidies in the arena of
EU fleet capacity management, where the success of rebalancing EU fleet capacity
with resource availability has been somewhat thwarted by inappropriate funding
measures. Underlying issues surrounding the framework of capacity reduction initia-
tives have played a similar influential role. Therefore, the focus of this paper is as
follows. The next section introduces the management implications of various types
of subsidies in fisheries, with special focus placed on the use of vessel decommis-
sioning. The evolution of EU capacity management and application of subsidies is
then considered. The case of the Danish fishing fleet offers further insight into the
mechanisms of capacity adjustment, in terms of decommissioning, modernisation,
and renewal of vessels. The evolution of fleet production and efficiency indicators
are also presented.1 The paper is concluded with a discussion of the underlying is-
sues of subsidy use in EU fleet capacity management and considers possible
changes to the management regime.
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The implementation of the European Common Fisheries Policy (CFP)2 in 1983
was a product of lengthy negotiations following the adoption of the Exclusive Eco-
nomic Zones (EEZs) in 1976, when it was decided that the European Community
was best placed to manage fisheries in the waters under its jurisdiction. The aims of
the CFP included the conservation of fish stocks, industry structures (such as fishing
fleets), the common organisation of markets, and an external fisheries policy (nego-
tiations and fishing agreements [Holden 1994; DG Fisheries 2003]). Of particular
relevance to this paper was the adoption of a structural policy, which offered an op-
portunity to facilitate change in the fisheries sector by the means of granting
Community financial aid, whilst upholding the overall structural policy objective3
to, “promote harmonious and balanced development of this industry within the gen-
eral economy and to encourage rational use of the biological resources of the sea.”
The long-term objective of the structural policy has been to make the fishing
sector economically viable, whilst contributing to a more selective and sustainable
utilisation of available resources (Holden 1994). Another important objective has
been to secure sound economic and social conditions for the enterprises and persons
employed in the sector. In order to satisfy these objectives, Multi-annual Guidance
Programmes (MAGPs) have sought to encourage a sustainable balance between the
capacity of the EU fishing fleets and the available resources by first stabilising and
then removing capacity from the fishery. This approach has been warranted as a re-
sult of the general failure of management to effectively deal with the underlying
reasons for excess capacity and continued declines in many important commercial
fish stocks. Indeed, Gulland (1990)4 concluded that an average 40% reduction in
fishing mortality was required to rebalance fishing capacity with available re-
sources. These sentiments were further echoed by Lassen (1995) and showed that
several commercial stocks were still under far too much fishing pressure.
In 2001–02, the European Commission initiated a reform of the CFP in order to
address the current problems associated with EU fisheries management.5 With re-
spect to the capacity problem the Commission (COM(2000) 272 final, p.5)
acknowledged that, “although the current exploitation rates are too high, they repre-
sent only a fraction of what existing fleet capacity is potentially able to exert if it
were not for the constraints imposed by Community regulations, and in particular
the quota allocations.”
In connection with their proposal to reform the CFP in 2002, the Commission
(COM(2002) 181 final, p. 3) further acknowledged that:
If current trends continue many Community fish stocks will collapse….The
fishing capacity of the Community fleet far exceeds that required to harvest
the available fishery resources in a sustainable manner. The most recent sci-
entific advice from ICES suggests that the level of fishing mortality of the
main Community fish stocks needs to be reduced by between one-third and
one-half, depending on the type of fishery and area concerned, in order to
ensure sustainable fishing.
2 The CFP is defined by Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome and Council Regulation (EEC) No. 170/83 of
25 January 1983, based on the freedom of establishment (labour and capital movement) and relative sta-
bility in fishing opportunities. The original objectives of the CFP were based on the Common Agricul-
tural Policy (e.g., increasing productivity by promoting technical progress). This failed to consider
negative externalities of fisheries production, which prevail when resources are common property.
3 As described in Council Regulation (EEC) No. 101/76 and further amplified in Council Regulation
(EEC) No. 4028/86.
4 In a report of a group of independent experts advising the European Commission.
5 A comprehensive review of the CFP reform proposals and accompanying capacity policies can be
found in Lindebo, Frost, and Løkkegaard (2002).Subsidies and EU Fleet Capacity 447
The end product of the reform was an array of Council Regulations aiming to
ensure the conservation and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources, specifi-
cally addressing structural assistance and emergency measures for the scrapping
(decommissioning) of fishing vessels.6 The major framework of the CFP now in
force builds on multi-annual management plans (in essence stock recovery plans),
fishing mortality reduction, capacity reference levels of fleets, effort regulation, and
greater scrutinisation of the use of subsidies. As a consequence, subsidies for fleet
modernisation and renewal were phased out in 2005.7 The Commission further ac-
knowledged that any postponement of measures needed to deal with overcapacity
would generate even greater social costs in the future, if fish stocks were allowed to
continue their decline (COM(2002) 600 final).
But why have these problems arisen? OECD (1997, p.9) states that, “experience
has shown that a regime which does not adequately limit fishing capacity may lead
to overexploitation and poor economic performance. The main reason for the poor
results is that these regimes do not give the fisherman the incentive to account for
the costs of his fishing activity.”
FAO (2001) identifies overcapacity as the major physical manifestation of the
dissipation of resource rents often referred to by economists. In other words, some
(or all) potential socio-economic gains of fisheries exploitation are dissipated into
excessive capacity in the form of redundant vessels or redundant inputs in general.
This happens because the use of the limited renewable resource is unpriced. FAO
(2001) further consider that although excess capacity builds up due to the invest-
ment decisions of individual fishermen, the underlying fault is a regulatory one. In
the absence of measures to correct a market failure in fisheries (stemming from free
and open access to a public good), fishermen receive economic signals that encour-
age them to invest at excess levels from a fisheries point of view. In fisheries where
the market failure has been resolved (e.g., under rights-based management) this in-
centive disappears, as does overcapacity, in principle. Under such circumstances,
fishermen are given explicit incentives to reduce investment in fishing capital, help-
ing to mitigate the inherent problems of race to fish and dissipation of resource rents
(OECD 1997).
The unleashing of overcapacity into the limited resources in EU waters has been
rather evident in this respect and is a major reason for relying on a rather predomi-
nant capacity management approach to deal with the adverse consequences. Not
only does the current fleet situation lead to continued pressure on fishing stocks, but
the overcapitalised nature of fleets and underutilisation of fishing capacity also rep-
resent an economic waste to society (opportunity cost). The difficulties of trying to
address biological imperatives while accommodating a multitude of political, eco-
nomic, and socio-economic interests have also hampered the progress of the CFP
and the overall structural policy. However, the implementation of rights-based man-
agement  has  not  been  a  privilege  of  the  Community  as  a  whole,  but  the
responsibility of each member state, and hence cannot be mandated within the cur-
rent CFP set-up.8 Further, the allocation of quotas to each member state makes the
capacity problem a national one in terms of the associated waste of economic re-
sources, while it cannot be a Community problem unless overcapacity creates a
control problem.
Over the years, the policy initiatives that aim to ensure sustainable exploitation
of fisheries in Community waters have been rather inconsistent with regards to re-
6 Council Regulations (EC) No. 2369/2002, 2370/2002, and 2371/2002.
7 Some supports will remain to improve gear selectivity, fish quality, etc.
8 The institutional context of the CFP is well described in Holden (1994).Lindebo 448
ducing fleet capacity whilst simultaneously promoting and sustaining a competitive
industry through the active use of subsidies. Direct economic incentives in terms of
budgeted grants or subsidised lending for construction and modernisation will tend
to result in capacity being maintained at an uneconomically high level, with adjust-
ments to the structure of fishing capacity being delayed and catch rates being kept at
lower levels. This has the effect of worsening the financial situation of firms that
would be profitable (or more so) if the bankrupt part of the fleet were allowed to
fold (FAO 2001). Subsidies available to the industry are a further indication of lack
of economic efficiency, as well as the more general undesired use of public finances.
Subsidies in Fisheries
The use of subsidies in fisheries has gathered worldwide attention in recent years
through extensive work programmes and commissioned reports by many interna-
tional organisations and fora (cf. World Bank 1998; FAO 2001; OECD 1997, 2002,
2003; WTO 2001; WWF 1998a,b, 2002; UNEP 1998, 2000). The general consensus
has been that subsidies can be harmful to sustainability and may, among other
things, help to encourage the buildup of capacity through raised expectations in the
industry. Furthermore, the general effects of subsidies will tend to vary under differ-
ent management regimes and depend on the status of resources. Subsidies in the EU
have been under increasing scrutiny for a number of reasons, including the inclusion
of fishing subsidies on the WTO agenda and the issue of coherence with other EU
policies, such as sustainability, development, and environmental protection (IEEP
2002a,b).
Typologies and Impacts
Under the International Plan of Action for Managing Fishing Capacity, the Food and
Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) has called for the reduction
and progressive elimination of subsidies and economic incentives that contribute di-
rectly or indirectly to the buildup of excessive capacity (FAO 2001). In particular,
they stress that firms will tend to invest in a fishery as long as there are profits to be
made. If subsidies help to reduce costs of exploitation, then profits may still be en-
sured and incentives to invest will prevail. Although capacity-neutral subsidies may
be applied to encourage fleet reduction, safety, fish quality, improved port infra-
structure, conservation, and responsible fishing practices, actually targeting
subsidies to specific fisheries or fleets may be difficult.
Structural changes as a result of subsidies tend to be two-fold. They either lead
to changes in production of the individual vessels or changes in the overall number
of vessels in the fleet, based on the underlying mechanisms with respect to levels of
fishing effort. In some cases, both scenarios can be expected. Anderson (1986)
shows the impact of subsidies on the cost and revenue structure and the open-access
level of fishing effort in a static Gordon-Schaefer long-run equilibrium model. The
basic argument is that the fishery will find an effort equilibrium level where rev-
enues equal the exploitation costs and opportunity costs of the production factors in
an open-access fishery. Although most fisheries are not generally open access, the
underlying mechanisms still hold. If subsidies are applied to increase fish prices, for
example, higher revenues will result and effort/capacity will be attracted until a
higher equilibrium level is reached. A subsidy that lowers variable costs (e.g., fuel)
will have a similar impact. Arnason (1998) further shows that lump sum subsidies
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is increased as a result. However, where effort can be effectively constrained, as
generally done in EU fisheries, these effects do not materialise (Hatcher and
Robinson 1998).
There is a range of subsidies that can have a direct or indirect impact on the
level of fishing capacity/effort of the fishing fleet, including:
• Income support and unemployment insurance (e.g., tax relief);
• Price subsidies and subsidies to processing and marketing (e.g., minimum price);
• Access to third country waters;
• Subsidies of capital costs (e.g., vessel modernisation and construction, soft
investment loans);
• Subsidies of variable costs (e.g., tax exemption for fuel, subsidised insurance);
• Subsidies for vessel decommissioning.
For example, the use of income support will tend to lower a fisherman’s oppor-
tunity cost; i.e., the difference in income that can be earned elsewhere will be
marginalised and the fisherman is more likely to stay in the fishery. The same im-
pact can be expected when revenues are enhanced through price supports or costs
are reduced through tax exemptions on fuel or more favourable investment condi-
tions. This will ultimately result in higher capacity/effort levels than would
otherwise have been the case if inefficient or bankrupt vessel owners had left the
fishery to seek more income in another industry. Further, it potentially increases the
investment incentives (i.e., greater profits are being made than if supports were not
being applied).
Although these kinds of subsidies have been given less attention, mainly due the
lack of transparency of national aid programmes, they are perceived to have a sig-
nificant impact. Any financial instrument that helps to alter the cost/revenue
structure of fishing operations will impact profitability and determine the likely in-
vestment responses by fishermen. The same can be argued for the application of
third country agreements, where individual fishermen, in essence, are being
subsidised to exploit resources in distant waters that would have been less profitable
were fishermen to cover the fees for access themselves. However, if alternative in-
come levels outside the fishery are close to zero (i.e., vessels and skipper skills tend
to be difficult to transfer to land activities), then this type of financial support may
not necessarily alter the decision of whether to stay in or leave the fishery.
IFREMER (1999) show that explicit, but indirect, subsidies are imbedded in in-
ternational fishing access agreements that compensate a third country for a given
level of access for EU fishing fleets. This helps to subsidise a significant part of the
effective costs of a distant water fleet. It can also be expected that the agreements
play a pivotal role in alleviating the need for capacity reduction in some member
state fleets, at least in the short term, although the exact extent by which this occurs
cannot be verified here. It is nevertheless clear that the agreements act as a
subsidisation of access to resources for private operators, and thus allow many ves-
sels to maintain an active role (capacity) in fishing as a result.
It needs noting that there are subsidies that can prove more beneficial, if care-
fully defined and targeted. For example, supporting investments in new onboard
satellite technologies may ultimately help to reduce the costs of government surveil-
lance activities. The multi-species interaction of many fisheries may provide another
alternative for using subsidies. For example, applying a price premium for North
Sea whiting (which predates on juvenile cod) could result in a direct improvement in
the North Sea cod stock, if the whiting stock is harvested more intensely as a result.
Such finely tuned, targeted subsidies could have a very beneficial outcome in terms
of improved cod stocks, and so outweigh the cost of the initial subsidy.Lindebo 450
Use of Vessel Decommissioning
Vessel decommissioning is often thought of as a management tool for regulating
fisheries,  which  seeks  to  rationalise  the  size  of  fishing  fleets  (Holland,
Gudmundsson, and Gates 1999). In addition, it can also be thought of as a form for
subsidising the industry, as noted above. The success of these programmes relies
heavily on whether fishermen can be drawn out of the fishery for future financial
gain, as opposed to what they would otherwise gain if they remained in the fishery
(Frost et al. 1995; Guyader, Daures, and Fifas 2000). Hence, the costs of decommis-
sioning schemes can be quite expensive.
Munro (1998) specifies that there are at least two reasons for questioning the
use of subsidies for vessel decommissioning:
• Incentives: A subsidised decommissioning programme may alleviate the
overcapacity problem in the short term, but only at the cost of intensifying the
problem in the longer term if the investment incentives are impacted. That is,
authorities may succeed in creating the impression that every time the
industry is in distress, external intervention will intervene to bail the industry
out and thus reduce investment risk.
• Spillover effects: If vessel capital is simply relocated from one fishery to
another fishery suffering from ineffective management, then benefits of
capacity reduction in one fishery are at the cost of intensifying comparable
problems elsewhere. Hence, we have to ensure that vessel decommissioning
actually means permanent and physical scrapping of the vessel concerned.
Vessel decommissioning schemes could, therefore, in the long term actually in-
tensify the problem of overcapacity worldwide. Clark, Munro, and Sumaila (2004)
further conclude that decommissioning schemes can benefit conservation, provided
that they are unanticipated by the vessel owners. Both conservation and economic
efficiency goals may be negatively impacted if the schemes are anticipated.
Jørgensen and Jensen (1998), using a simulation model for fishermen’s investment
decisions, support the view that reducing risk through repeated decommissioning
schemes will raise levels of investment and may have significant impacts on local
stability. Similar opinions are given by Hatcher and Robinson (1998).
A further consideration is that following the removal of vessels, remaining par-
ticipants may be able to increase their effort in order to utilise a larger share of the
quota, resulting in a similar level of fishing pressure on stocks. It can also be ex-
pected that the least efficient vessels are the first to accept financial compensation
for leaving the fishery. Although these conditions will likely lead to an improvement
in overall efficiency and economic performance of fishing fleets, there will likely be
little impact on fishing effort (Hatcher and Robinson 1998). It is thus pertinent to
not only ensure that re-entry of vessels does not occur, but also that remaining ves-
sels do not expand their operations (at least initially), if the goals of stock
improvement and long-term benefits of fleet reduction are not to erode. In this re-
spect, it is also imperative that overall quotas are being respected in the first place.
Weninger and McConnell (2000) acknowledge that vessel decommissioning is
often a politically acceptable policy that may improve biological and economic con-
ditions in the short term, and with compensation given to exiting fishermen, the
policy also seem to be acceptable to the industry. They support the notion, however,
that the policy fails to address the underlying externalities in fisheries that create
overcapitalisation, and hence in the longer term, problems accruing from capital in-
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cases the incentives to invest will be reinforced to take advantage of improving con-
ditions. It is perhaps here that I should note the similar impact of these schemes
when compared to other more direct subsidies outlined in the previous section. Hol-
land,  Gudmundsson,  and  Gates  (1999)  draw  on  evaluations  of  vessel
decommissioning schemes worldwide, identifying the same problems related to re-
entry and investments in remaining vessels. They find, for a number of cases, that
conservation goals have been thwarted and the economic cost of fish has increased,
due to these problems prevailing in the post-decommissioning situation. Further,
they note that funded vessel decommissioning leads to important social adjustments
through asymmetric financial transfers to participants in the fishery, irrespective of
whether conservation and efficiency goals are actually achieved.
In an international workshop on fishing vessel and license buyback programmes
convened in La Jolla, CA, USA, March 2004, numerous case studies were presented
to shed light on important application and design issues of vessel decommissioning
schemes.9 Preliminary conclusions from the workshop include:
• It is only a second-best solution to fishery management where defined property
rights or other economic instruments are not in place. Capacity control is needed
due to market failure leading to overfishing and perverse economic incentives.
• It should not be a long-term application (e.g., use for short-term recovery plans,
or to deal with problems of sunk costs during a shift in a management system).
• Industry participation is vital to improve transparency, legitimacy, and to lower
the cost of programmes.
• Define clear objectives of programmes—biological, economic, etc.
• Do we target latent or active capacity? Removing active capacity first will result
in greater reduction in fishing pressure, but may lead to reactivation of latent
capacity. Removing latent capacity first may, thus, be the prudent approach.
• Do we target efficient or inefficient vessels? Vessels have different cost structures
and different impacts on resources, and targeting will determine the successful
outcome of programmes.
Finally, Hannesson (2004) considers that since the justification of vessel decom-
missioning lies in the realisation of expected future benefits, it may be a reasonable
condition that programmes are ultimately funded by those remaining in the fishery
(i.e., no public subsidies should be involved). He further stresses that without such
an approach, the cost of the programme will probably exceed the rent generated by
the vessel decommissioning programme. Some form of cost recovery structure
should, therefore, be implemented to justify the use of public funds for this purpose
(Schrank, Arnason, and Hannesson 2003).
The EU Fleet Capacity Policy
Fishing Capacity
As discussed in the introduction, the issue of fishing capacity has been at the fore-
front of fisheries management concerns in recent years.10 Fishing capacity has most
often been defined as a physical input of fish production, such as vessel tonnage, en-
gine power, and days at sea, and represents a proxy of variable costs of fishing
9 Organised by the US National Marine Fisheries Service and the University of California San Diego.
10 Regretfully, the role of subsidies in this respect has merited less attention.Lindebo 452
operations.11 Fishing capacity in the EU has historically been measured in terms of
nominal gross tonnage (GT) of the vessel and engine kilowatt power (kW)—assum-
ing full utilisation of fishing vessels. These characteristics have been measured,
monitored, and registered as indicators of fishing capacity, as specified by Council
Regulation (EEC) No 2930/86, and have been regarded as the most practical param-
eters for expressing fishing capacity of the fleets using active gears.12
In addition to this fishing capacity terminology, a further term known as fishing
effort has been applied, commonly defined for operational reasons as an aggregate
measure of tonnage, engine power, and fishing activity (days at sea). Since 1992, the
two terms have worked in union to monitor desired fleet reductions in the EU.
A register of fishing vessels was set up in 1989 to allow the European Commis-
sion to implement and monitor the CFP. The register is a record of the physical
characteristics of all commercial marine fishing vessels in the EU fleet. At the end
of 2002, the register contained just over 90,500 fishing vessels, representing 7.26
million kW and 1.96 million GT. The indexed changes observed in the register over
the last decade can be viewed in figure 1.
Considerable difficulties have been encountered in the measurement and regis-
tration of capacity, both in technical and administrative terms, and the lack of
reliable and homogeneous capacity indicators should be seen as one of the main
stumbling blocks in past and present capacity-reduction initiatives. For example, de-
fining fishing capacity in terms of two inputs should be scrutinised. Fishing
capacity, or the ability of a vessel to catch fish, is a highly complex concept and de-
pends on multiple inputs. Although tonnage and engine power will significantly
impact a vessel’s catching ability, and monitoring of these inputs may provide a
simple indicator of capacity, it should be acknowledged that other inputs that are not
monitored might allow an increase in effective capacity.
Multi-annual Guidance Programmes
In order to attain a sustainable balance between the capacity of the EU fishing fleet
and the available resources, a new structural policy was implemented in 1983. This
helped to establish a string of structural adjustment measures, including the intro-
duction of the extensive MAGP capacity adjustment policy.13 The MAGP set out a
series of multi-annual capacity targets for all EU member states and their fleets. In
order to remove excess capacity from fisheries, vessel decommissioning and effort
reduction were the most frequent measures applied.14 Other measures, such as joint
enterprises, export to third countries, and reassignment for purposes other than fish-
ing were also used, although to a much lesser extent.
In conjunction with these programmes, additional financial measures for inter
alia vessel renewal and modernisation were also applied to help restructure the EU
fishing fleet.15 The main aims were to help improve safety and catch quality, etc., to
11 In contrast to FAO, based on Kirkley and Squires (1999), who define capacity as an output measure of
fish production. Applying the input definition to capacity adjustment programmes in the EU has clouded
the assessment of impacts of capacity reduction and should be seen as one major reason for continued
levels of overcapacity.
12 Council Decision 97/413/EC.
13 Further elaboration on MAGPs and EU fleet adjustment can be found in Lindebo (1999).
14 Through temporary restrictions imposed on vessel activity (days at sea) since 1992. Although this
measure may have addressed the objective of reducing fishing pressure on stocks, it allowed member
states to reduce their capacity reduction targets, resulting in more modest cuts in the EU fishing fleet
than what was ultimately needed for prudent fleet adjustment.
15 If MAGP objectives were fulfilled.Subsidies and EU Fleet Capacity 453
secure sound economic and social conditions for the enterprises and the persons em-
ployed in the sector, and to create a reasonable, stable income level. The process has
aimed at giving EU fishermen a financial incentive to leave the fishery, and so si-
multaneously provides economic relief for fishermen who wish to leave the fishery.
Vessels remaining in the fishery should benefit from an improvement in the eco-
nomic results through a reduction in fixed costs, improved catches, and greater
competitiveness.16
Despite the introduction of MAGPs in 1983, it became clear that serious atten-
tion to fleet adjustment was required in the 1990s following rather modest fleet
objectives and reductions seen during the 1983–91 period. In an attempt to improve
the success rate of fleet capacity management, the EU fleet was subsequently seg-
mented depending on how each vessel was geared towards fish stocks, defined on
the basis of the zone fished, the species exploited, and the fishing gear used. Fleet
segment reduction objectives were set in accordance with desired fishing mortality
rates of certain fish stocks, ‘weighted’ on the basis of biological advice on fish stock
overexploitation.17 During the period 1991 to 30 June 2002, the EU fleet realised re-
ductions of approximately 20%, both in terms of vessel tonnage and engine power,
although to varying degrees across member states and fleet segments.18
Although most of the capacity reduction objectives of the MAGP were ulti-
mately met, the translated effect of a similar reduction in fishing pressure on stocks
did not materialise. Reasons for this could be connected to the continued and rather
inconsistent availability of subsidies for the modernisation and renewal of vessels.
After all, the clear objective was to reestablish capacity/resource balance. The ad-
verse effects of other subsidies, helping to indirectly impact capacity and effort
levels by influencing investment incentives and cost/revenue structures (as dis-
cussed in the previous section), are also considered to be of importance in this
respect. Furthermore, factors including the continuous changes in fishery dynamics,
complex fleet segmentations, amendments of fleet objectives, and the lack of seri-
Figure 1. EU Fleet Register, 1991–2002
Source: Eurostat New Cronos database (extracted 21 April 2004), excludes Finland and Sweden.
16 COM(96) 237 final.
17 Council Decision 97/413/EC.
18 COM(97) 352 final and COM(2002) 483 final.Lindebo 454
ousness attached to required cuts in fishing opportunities to safeguard fish stocks
have most likely played an important role.
The issue of technological progress is also deemed to have been influential in
this respect. For example, despite EU fleet reductions of some 20% over the last de-
cade, these nominal reductions have not accounted for technological advances or
changes in productivity of vessels. For illustrative purposes, an annual 2% increase
in productivity due to technological progress over ten years will need to be offset by
a 22%19 reduction in fishing capacity if status quo is to be maintained.20 Further-
more, since an annual 2% increase is regarded as a rather modest estimate, and all
production inputs are not under control allowing input substitution, a 20% nominal
reduction in tonnage and engine power over ten years should not be regarded as a
highly notable achievement. A study commissioned by the European Commission
suggests that the impact of technological progress on fishing effort can indeed be
significant and highly variable, both in spatial and dynamic terms (Banks et al.
2001). The study concludes that technological progress may undermine reductions
in nominal capacity through an increase in productivity, and should be considered
when addressing the needs for capacity reduction.
A New Community Fleet Policy
At the end of 2002, the MAGP was discontinued following the reform of the CFP in
response to the fairly modest results it managed to deliver. Under new regulations,
however, tonnage and engine power measures of capacity remain in force. These in-
dicators form the basis for new capacity reference levels of fishing fleets,
intrinsically based on the MAGP objectives at the end of 2002 (table 1). These refer-
ence levels now serve as a maximum ceiling to capacity development of fishing
fleets and will be used to gauge the status of fisheries in relation to available re-
sources and fishing mortality reductions (especially under stock recovery plans).
The ongoing establishment of new regional advisory councils (RACs), with ac-
tive stakeholder involvement, should also assist the process of establishing more
prudent fleet policies. Here, stakeholders21 will be able to contribute management
advice to the Commission (e.g., in relation to stock recovery plans) that, if imple-
mented, should improve overall industry acceptance of the capacity adjustment
policy. However, the RACs are still in their infancy, and it is too early to tell to what
extent this stakeholder advice will influence the management approach.
The new capacity management approach no longer defines a set of specific ca-
pacity objectives for member states or fleets, as was the case under the MAGP. The
adjustment of capacity will occur indirectly via limitations on fishing effort (days at
sea restrictions) and new, multi-annual management plans (e.g., fishing mortality re-
duction, stock recovery plans). For example, management plans will likely cause
severe reductions in fishing opportunities in certain segments of the fleet, as cur-
rently seen with the recovery plans of the cod and hake fisheries in the North Sea.
The reduction of fishing capacity in response to fishing effort limits will be the re-
sponsibility of member states, with the new Community fleet policy being asked to
create the environment to encourage this capacity reduction. The main instrument to
physically control fleet capacity is established via the reference levels of the indi-
vidual member state and stringent entry:exit capacity ratios, and will be adjusted
19 Productivity increase of 22% is calculated by P*(1.02)10.
20 Assuming constant returns to scale.
21 This includes fishermen, industry representatives, NGOs, government, scientists, etc.Subsidies and EU Fleet Capacity 455Lindebo 456
according to Commission Regulation (EC) No 1438/2003. For example, the refer-
ence levels will be adjusted downwards by the same amount leaving the fleet with
public aid.
An overall reduction in the capital employed is the first, essential step towards
improving economic performance of the sector. In this sense, public aid (subsidies)
to investment in the fishing fleet has been counterproductive, promoting oversupply
of capital by reducing costs and investment risks and thereby distorting competition. As
a result, the Commission sought to restrict aid for modernisation, renewal, and ex-
port of vessels under the CFP reform. More specifically, the Commission sought to:
• Remove aid for new capacity;
• Remove aid for export of vessels and joint enterprises;
• Restrict modernisation aid (e.g., safety, selective fishing gears, etc);
• Ensure that any fleet renewal takes place without any increase in fishing effort;
• Ensure that both fishing vessels and their licences are withdrawn from the fishery;
• Ensure that scrapping of fishing vessels is prioritised.
Consequently, all funds for modernisation and construction were phased out in
2005.
Financial Aid
In support of the structural policy objectives, in 1993 all the common structural
measures relating to fisheries were integrated into an overall system of EU structural
funding under a single financial instrument, the Financial Instrument for Fisheries
Guidance (FIFG). Community and national aid to the fisheries sector was on the or-
der of  2.66 billion for the period 1994–99. Of this figure,  894 million was
granted to vessel decommissioning and  594 to renewal and modernisation, with
the remainder being made available for aquaculture, port facilities, processing, and
marketing. One-third of the total aid was sourced nationally.
FIFG structural aid allocations for 2000–2006 total  3.6 billion (DG Fisheries
2001), and were slightly modified following the 2002 CFP reform to take account of
adverse socioeconomic and regional impacts of fishing effort reductions, including
actions for short-term emergency scrapping measures and the phasing out of
modernisation and construction grants. The breakdown of community and national
aid for fishing fleets is given in table 2. Emergency measures have been introduced
to provide additional incentives to the owners of fishing vessels in order to urgently
address overcapacity in fisheries where stocks are outside safe biological limits. To
address this imbalance, a  32 million emergency measure will allow member states
to offer additional funds for scrapping vessels that are severely impacted.22 The
timeframe for this measure is 2003–06 to encourage rapid fleet adjustment. The
Commission has used scientific advice on recommended reductions in fishing effort,
linked to the perceived effect such reductions will have on Community fishing ves-
sels in the fishing vessel register, to estimate the required removal of some 8,500
vessels, representing some 350,000 GT.23
In addition to national matching funding under FIFG, national financial trans-
22 A reduction of 25% or more in the fishing opportunities of the vessel concerned is used as an objec-
tive indicator of ‘severe impact.’
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fers also include a number of schemes initiated independently by the member states.
These ‘State Aids’ include grants, interest subsidies, and tax reductions, and many
published figures are believed to be understated (IEEP 2002a). Distortions in fund-
ing allocation among member states are also apparent, and may influence the
relative competitiveness of their fleets.
Financial aid guaranteeing the minimum price of fish for fishermen has also
been applied in the EU. If the market price is lower than this minimum price, Pro-
ducer Organisations (POs) for example, may purchase fish for the minimum price
and take it out of the market. Such schemes may or may not include an element of
public subsidisation. In some countries, the funds available for POs are paid by the
fishermen themselves when prices are high. Thus, under such conditions there is no
element of subsidisation in the scheme, and it merely acts to equalise fluctuations of
the market. In other countries, the government pays the whole or part of the amount
for the withdrawal of fish, and thereby acts as a direct subsidy. In this regard,
Hatcher (2000) outlines how the EU common market organisation for fisheries has
provided indirect support for fishing fleets by paying compensation for fish landings
that failed to find a market at specified minimum prices. Between 1983 and 1990,
almost  180 million was earmarked for such support. Since 1991, annual reports of
the Court of Auditors of the European Communities show that annual expenditure
on market support has been on the order of over  30 million per annum (Hatcher
2000). It is unclear, however, what direct impact this has had on capacity adjust-
ment.
The subsidisation of fisheries access agreements has been seen as a way to re-
duce capacity in the EU while securing employment and supplies of fish for the
European market. However, fair competition in third country waters is distorted by
the support given to the EU fleet in the form of different subsidies, in addition to
general competition with national fleets (IEEP 2002a). The regulation of EU vessel
operations is also scrutinised, as third country enforcement capabilities are often not
of a high enough standard to enforce quota limitations. Third country agreements in
1999–2000 totalled just over  400 million, with the largest sums going to
Mauritania, Greenland, Angola, and Senegal (IEEP 2002a). There are also distor-
tions among EU member states with regards to the beneficiaries of these subsidies,
with Spain and France, in particular, reaping most of the rewards from these access
agreements, perhaps as much as 80% of the total fisheries resources under the agree-
ments. It is difficult to assess the exact economic and social benefits to the EU
member states and the third country, although it appears that significant benefits ac-
crue to commercial EU interests (IEEP 2002b).
Table 2
Allocated EU Fleet Measures, 2000–2006 (  million)
Adjustment of Fishing Effort* (1) Renewal and Modernisation (2) (2)/(1)
FIFG National Total FIFG National Total
EU Total 658.58 403.97 1,062.55 829.16 349.86 1,179.02 1.11
Note: *Vessel decommissioning, joint enterprises, and reallocation to third countries.
Source: IEEP (2002a).Lindebo 458
Rationalisation of the Danish Fleet
Fleet Adjustment
As noted, a fundamental structural change in the fisheries sector has been required,
mainly because of scarcity of resources in EU waters. The Danish fishing fleet has
not been an exception. During the late 1980s and early 90s, the situation for the
most important stocks for the Danish fishing fleet deteriorated, most notably for cod
in the North Sea and Baltic Sea. The Danish authorities have, therefore, over the
years focused on fleet reduction by means of vessel decommissioning whilst impos-
ing rather stringent restrictions regarding granting permission for entry of new
vessels into the fishing fleet. Simultaneously, the banking sector has been very re-
luctant to finance the renewal of vessels and exerted some pressure on fishermen to
accept decommissioning aid despite incurring financial losses (Frost et al. 1995).
The result has been that the capacity (size) of the Danish fleet has been significantly
reduced over the last two decades, and the fishing fleet is now comparatively old,
with an average age of over 30 years (Lindebo 2000).
Under the MAGP umbrella, as considered in the previous section, Frost et al.
(1995) indicate reductions in Danish fleet capacity to have been almost 30% in
terms of gross registered tonnage (GRT) during 1987–93. Further, during the 1992–96
MAGP period, the Danish fleet saw a 25% reduction in GRT and a 21% reduction in
kW, in excess of official reduction targets. This can be compared to total EU fleet reduc-
tions of 18% and 12%, respectively, for the same period.24 A slowdown in capacity
reduction was seen under the 1997–2002 MAGP. Fleet reductions of 6% and 3.5% were
observed for the period, in terms of GT and kW, respectively; again in excess of re-
quirements since fleet reduction objectives by this time had already been satisfied.25
Although these fleet reductions should largely be attributed to the application of
MAGPs, there are also other probable causes for capacity change. These include
changes in productivity, fish prices, fuel prices, and other costs, as well as resource
changes. Jensen (1998) also examines the impact of tax policies on investment in
Danish fisheries, namely the application of a 65% deduction of depreciation ex-
penses in the first two years. This deduction contributes to a positive net present
value of the effective, after-tax price of capital. In this regard, he concludes that the
relative after-tax user cost of capital and profitability in the fishery strongly influ-
ences investment behaviour, and has thus affected the level of fleet capacity.
The actual financial aid (subsidy) packages for the Danish fishing fleet during
1994–2002 are portrayed in table 3.
The funds for renewal and modernisation are rather striking, and the extent of
private funds seems to suggest that there have been rather strong incentives to in-
vest, despite downturns in commercial fish stocks. Most notably, over 50% of total
funds have been earmarked for modernisation purposes during 1994–2002. This
should perhaps be seen as a period of consolidation, since the industry has experi-
enced a considerable downsizing trend. However, restrictions on the size of the fleet
and strict entry:exit ratios have continued to ensure that the capacity adjustments
undertaken have not been cancelled out by additions to the fleet.26 It is nevertheless
considered that creating incentives to invest in fishing vessels, indirectly improving
their economic performance, is contradictory to the approach of streamlining fleet
sizes to address the overcapacity problem.
24 COM(97) 352 final.
25 COM(2002) 446 final and COM(2002) 483 final.
26 For example, modernisation projects that resulted in an increase in capacity could only be granted
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The aim of allocating financial aid for vessel modernisation has been to
rationalise the fishery, to improve the storage and quality of fish products, to pro-
mote more selective and environmentally friendly (including energy saving) fishing
practises, to improve the working and safety conditions on board, and/or to allow
better fisheries surveillance. A key economic objective has been improvement in the
quality of fish landed, which, in turn, leads to increasing value in the future. There
have also been strides to improve the competitiveness of Danish vessels in Commu-
nity waters. In contrast, the aim of funding vessel construction has been to promote
renewal and permanently adjust the structure of the fishing fleet. However, the strict
capacity regulation in force, requiring at least an equal amount of capacity being
withdrawn, meant that funded vessel construction was limited to only a handful of
projects in the 1990s. Vessel owners have, therefore, tended to seek funding for
modernisation in order to improve their status in the fishery.
Impact on Fleet Production and Efficiency
What is of great interest is to assess whether the financial aid packages and associ-
ated fleet adjustment initiatives have had the desired impact on the Danish fishing
fleet. By looking at the period 1994–2002, we observe that both the fleet size and
overall catch have steadily decreased since the mid-1990s (figure 2). Thus, there is
little evidence to suggest that reductions in fleet size during the period have resulted
in improved catch opportunities.
Through further investigation, aggregate Danish catch rates (in nominal effort
terms), have declined from 18.7 tonnes per GT in 1994 to 14.5 tonnes in 2002, with
a peak of over 20 tonnes per GT in 1995 (table 4). Conversely, catch rates, in value
terms, have increased slightly from 33.9 DKK per GT in 1994 to 36.9 DKK in 2002,
with a peak in 1997. This seems to depict that despite fleet reductions over the pe-
riod, catch rates in volume terms have not improved, whereas increases in fish
prices have led to some improvement in catch rates in value terms. This trend is sup-
ported by analysing catch in relation to insurance value.27 This defends the notion
that despite fleet reductions in Denmark, the underlying catch opportunities and
quota levels in EU waters have not allowed the remaining vessels to significantly
improve their aggregate catch rates.
Table 3
Actual Aid for Danish Fleet Measures, 1994–2002 (  million)
EU FIFG National Private Total No. of Tonnage Power
Funds Funds Funds Funds Projects (GT) (kW)
Vessel decommissioning 41.08 40.01 - 81.09 572 20,088 72,102
Joint enterprises 0.46 0.46 - 0.92 1 390 810
Vessel construction 10.55 2.89 44.08 57.52 76 8,179 19,640
Vessel modernisation 34.28 8.15 120.35 162.78 2,477 - -
Total 86.37 51.51 164.43 302.31 - - -
Source: Danish Directorate for Development (2003a,b).
27 However, catch per unit insurance value is still a partial productivity measure.Lindebo 460
Of significant importance is that the Danish fleet consists of vessels that, in
general, are able to switch fishery during the fishing seasons. Given that several of
these fisheries are not access regulated, the result is that the policy has not reduced
overcapacity in the most profitable fisheries (e.g., cod fishery) and consequently too
much effort is still aimed at these fisheries. Given the poor development of the vital
demersal Danish catches, the main purpose of relieving the pressure on fish stocks
and balancing capacity with the fishing possibilities has not been achieved. Most
notably, catch statistics show how Danish catches of cod have steadily declined
from over 90,000 tonnes in 1996 to only 31,500 tonnes in 2003 (Directorate of Fish-
eries 2004). This also explains why despite significant fleet reductions during the
1980s and 90s, the Danish authorities have pursued further vessel decommissioning
in recent years in response to stock recovery plans and declines in fleet profitability.
Figure 2.  Danish Catch and Fleet Tonnage Development, 1994-2002
Note: Values at 2002 prices using GDP deflator.
Source: Directorate of Fisheries (2003) and online database www.fd.dk
Table 4
Aggregate Danish Catch Rates, 1994–2002
Catch per GT Catch per Insurance Value (million DKK)
Year Tonnes DKK Tonnes DKK
1994 18.7 33.9 383 594
1995 20.3 35.2 418 632
1996 17.2 34.6 359 643
1997 18.6 38.2 382 714
1998 15.8 38.0 321 708
1999 14.2 35.1 287 664
2000 15.0 33.1 283 603
2001 15.1 36.1 276 651
2002 14.5 36.9 264 671
Note: Values at 2002 prices using GDP deflator.
Source: Directorate of Fisheries (2003) and online database www.fd.dkSubsidies and EU Fleet Capacity 461
It should be noted, however, that unilateral reductions in capacity by one member
state will not have the desired effect of stock rebuilding if others member states do
not reduce their fleets correspondingly.28 It is, therefore, likely that some fisheries
exploited by Danish fishermen have also, to some extent, been affected by the ac-
tions of neighbouring countries.
Although it is profoundly difficult to directly link fleet reduction with the evo-
lution of capacity and efficiency of Danish vessels, a capacity analysis using Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) may provide valuable information on the status of
fleet segments. The estimation of full capacity output shows the extent to which
each vessel could expand its catch output compared to best practice vessels (Färe,
Grosskopf, and Lovell 1994; Kirkley and Squires 1999). Lindebo (2004) applies
DEA to annual aggregated catch and vessel input data to assess capacity utilisation
scores for the trawler segment for 1996-2002. Here, the capacity utilisation scores
range from 0 to 1, where 1 represents full capacity utilisation, and is an indicator of
the level of average fleet efficiency (table 5).29
The scores seem to indicate that the trawler segment has seen slight improve-
ments in efficiency over the period, but not to any significant extent. The moderate
increase in scores may be the result of the decommissioning of less efficient vessels dur-
ing the period, but other factors, such as resource status, may also be involved. Lindebo
(2004) further shows that the industrial fleet segment has improved in terms of capacity
utilisation over the period, from 0.42 in 1996 to 0.71 in 2002. Results for the Danish
seine fleet also portray a situation of higher capacity utilisation (e.g., 0.83 in 2002). In-
deed, Jørgensen and Jensen (1998) indicate that vessel decommissioning programmes in
the late 1980s helped pave the way for improvements in the Danish seine fleet. Regret-
fully, it is outside the scope of this paper to analyse economic performance and
observed fleet changes with respect to the direct application of subsides.
Discussion
As shown in this article, the role of subsidies with respect to capacity management
is rather comprehensive and may be highly influential. We have seen that, despite
the best intentions of EU (and Danish) authorities, little success has been achieved
with regards to achieving a long-term, sustainable balance between the fishing fleet
and available resources. The continued call for stock recovery plans and emergency
28 However, unilateral reductions in fleets should still improve the economic performance at the national
level, since the relative quota levels will remain the same under the relative stability principle.
29 Refer to Lindebo (2004) for further elaboration.
Table 5
Average Capacity Utilisation Scores—Danish Trawler Fleet
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Mean 0.51 0.61 0.61 0.64 0.69 0.72 0.67
St. dev. 0.28 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.23 0.25 0.26
Observations 117 105 104 100 126 134 130
Source: Lindebo (2004).Lindebo 462
scrapping measures is clear evidence of this. The misguided use of subsidies for
fleet renewal and modernisation has played an important role in the past, but so
have a range of factors that are vital to the successful outcome of capacity-reduction
initiatives (e.g., design of vessel decommissioning schemes, impact of technological
progress). More discrete uses of subsidies (e.g., access agreements, fuel subsidies,
tax relief) that help to influence the cost/revenue structure of fleet operations are
also likely to have impacted the levels of capacity and effort. These mechanisms
have, however, been more difficult to quantify with respect to the fleet capacity ini-
tiatives in the EU.
It is also relevant to refer back to important underlying issues when assessing
the capacity problem. The current EU management regime and quota system inher-
ently sends the wrong signals to fishermen through the implementation of
inappropriate regulation. The theory of fisheries economics indicates that fisheries
can be regulated efficiently if market forces, under rights-based regimes for ex-
ample, are allowed to dictate the evolution of fishing fleets. This creates an
environment that removes incentives for competitive build-up of excessive capacity
and fishing effort under race to fish conditions, an otherwise rational response by
fishermen to rents existing in the fishery (Gordon 1954). A management strategy
that is based on output constraints and the internalisation of externality problems,
through use of, for example, landing taxation or individual property rights, would
lead to divesting of capital in the fishery and a gradual optimisation of fleet capacity
(Scott 1955, 1979; Crutchfield 1979). This would, in time, lead to the overcapacity
issue being of little concern. FAO (2001) recognises, however, that the range of ca-
pacity management methods is often constrained by socio-political and technical
considerations. To some extent, this remains the largest stumbling block for fisheries
management in the EU.
The fundamental issue of capacity definition needs to be addressed, which may
allow for a better understanding of the moderate results in terms of stock recovery
attained under the capacity reduction programmes. Defining capacity as an input of
production rather than the FAO (1998) output definition of capacity means that ca-
pacity reductions cannot be directly related to catch output in an analytical
framework. That is, it is difficult to gauge what effects, if any, the removal of vessel
inputs through decommissioning schemes will have on the resource base. Since the
main aim of policymakers has been to reduce fishing pressure on stocks, establish-
ing the linkage between vessels and catch output is of the utmost importance, and
remains a serious obstacle to managers.
This article has noted that the use of vessel decommissioning should only be
considered as a second-best solution to the problem of overcapacity. Nevertheless,
the application of decommissioning may be useful to deal with short-term manage-
ment problems, such as current stock recovery plans, to aid the restructuring of the
sector under conditions of poor resource availability. What must be made clear from
the commencement of any such initiatives, however, are the objectives. For ex-
ample, if the desire is to assist a specific fishery, then specific targeting of vessels
and fleets for decommissioning is vital. This should allow ‘capacity-reducing’ subsi-
dies to be applied in a more prudent, effective manner, helping to ensure the desired
objectives are met, and are more cost effective in the process.
As highlighted in the academic literature, effective restriction on entry is essen-
tial if decommissioning schemes are to have any real impact. If not restricted, or if
effort levels of the remaining vessels are allowed to increase, then the aid given to
decommissioning should be regarded as an effort-enhancing subsidy. Hence, these
schemes should be scrutinised along the same lines as other investment subsidies. In
this context, it is also noteworthy that the application of long-term decommissioning
schemes will tend to result in increased industry expectations and reduced invest-Subsidies and EU Fleet Capacity 463
ment risk, and thus has as an undesired impact on capacity development. The appli-
cation of a comprehensive (and expensive) short-term decommissioning scheme is,
therefore, favoured.
The need for restructuring and renewal in the fleet is necessary and may require
some form of subsidisation to improve safety, gear selectivity, etc. Although it is the
general view of the author that construction and modernisation subsidies should not
be granted, as they will tend to enhance capacity and give mixed signals to the in-
dustry, a well-planned programme may allow such subsidies to have positive effects.
Here, it is essential that comprehensive capacity reductions are assured under a dis-
tinct first phase of decommissioning, without other forms of subsidisation for
renewal, ensuring that there is a sound basis for a vibrant industry. Carefully tar-
geted subsidies could then, in a distinct second phase, allow specific initiatives and
projects to seek other objectives. The previous application of subsidies in the EU ca-
pacity management setup, especially those that clearly helped to enhance capacity
and effort, were not structured this way. Here, the process would be further aided if
we obtained greater understanding of underlying economic incentives to help predict
fishermen’s reactions to subsidies and various policy initiatives in a practical man-
agement setting.
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